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SURVEY OF RECENT DECISIONS IN THE
LAW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
By Smith, Somerville & Case
Baltimore, Maryland

I. INJURIES COVERED BY ACT
A. Occupational Disease - Stress in Employment
The court of appeals ruled that a computer operator, who was subjected to continued harassment by
fellow employees, was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits under his claim for occupational
disease. The claimant alleged continued harassment by
management and fellow employees, including having an
explosive placed in his cigarette, having his vehicle
followed by co-workers, receiving annoying phone
calls at home, and being called racially offensive names
by co-workers. The claimant was diagnosed as having
post-traumatic stress, and he filed an occupational
disease claim. The Commission disallowed the claim
and the circuit court granted the employer's motion for
summary judgment finding that even if the claimant's
allegations were true, the employer was entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw. Prior to the court of special
appeals' consideration, the court of appeals on its own
motion issued a writ of certiorari and affirmed the
circuit court.
The court noted that an occupational disease is a
disease contracted by a covered employee that arises
out of and in the course of employment and that causes
the employee to become partially or totally incapacitated. The court reasoned that to be compensable, an
occupational disease under section 9-502(d) must be
due to the nature ofan employment in which the hazards
of the disease exist. The court found that the claimant's
job duties as a computer operator included entering data
and preparing paperwork, answering telephones and
reading manuals. Harassment by fellow employees was

not a hazard within the nature of the employment of a
computer data operator, and there was nothing peculiar
to the claimant's duties as a computer operator that
made him more susceptible to harassment than any
other kind of employment. Accordingly, the court held
that the claimant had not sustained a compensable
occupational disease based on stress. The court went
on to state that it was not willing to rule out the
possibility that some gradually resulting, purely mental
disease could be a compensable occupational disease.

Davis v. Dynacorp, 336 Md. 226, 647 A.2d 446 (1994).
Decided September 15, 1994.
B. Pre-Employment Physical Examination
The court of special appeals ruled that a claimant
who is inj ured during a pre-employment physical examination may be entitled to workers' compensation benefits. The claimant applied for employment in November 1990 and was interviewed in December 1990.
Thereafter, an hourly rate was agreed upon, and the
claimant was instructed to report for a physical examination on January 4, 1991. The employer testified that
this was a "pre-employment physical." The claimant
contended that attending the physical was her first job
duty. While walking to the lab, the claimant fell and
injured her knee. She was treated and then sent for the
examination. The claimant returned to the personnel
department, was introduced to employees and left for
the day. Subsequent to working on the January 7-8, the
claimant left due to a family emergency, returned to
work in March 1991, and again left the employment of
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the hospital. The claimant was paid for two hours work
on the day ofthe physical, although the date ofhire was
listed as January 7, 1991 in employer records. The
hospital argued that this payment was in error and that
the physical examination was a condition precedent to
her employment. The claimant argued that she was a
paid employee as of January 4, 1991, and that the
examination was not a condition precedent to employment.
The Commission found that the claimant did not
sustain a compensable injury as there was not an
employer/employee relationship on January, 4, 1991.
The circuit court reversed the Commission and found
that the claimant did sustain a compensable injury and
the employer appealed. The court of special appeals
held that ifan employer requires an individual to receive
a physical examination on its premises, and the reason
for the examination is for the employer's benefit, there
exists sufficient direction and control by the employer
for the examination to be within the scope of coverage
of the Workers' Compensation Act. The court distinguished such an examination from physical agility tests
that are used to allow a job applicant to demonstrate
qualifications for a particular job.
It is worth noting that this decision was made in the
context of a claim in which the claimant was seeking
workers' compensation benefits. As such, the benevolent purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act
were cited by the court in reaching a decision favorable
to the claimant. In its review of decisions from other
jurisdictions, the court hinted that the result may have
been different if this issue had arisen in the context of
a tort suit and the putative employer had raised the
exclusive immunity defense of workers' compensation
as a shield against the plaintiff s claim of negligence.
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Jacobson, 98 Md. App. 587,
634 A.2d 969 (1993). Decided December 29, 1993.

C. Traveling to Receive Medical Treatment
The court of special appeals addressed the issue of
whether an injury suffered while en route to medical
treatment for a prior compensable injury is itself
compensable even ifthe earlier injury was notacontributing factor in the second injury.
The claimant sustained an accidental injury on July
5, 1989 for which he received workers' compensation
benefits. While entering a building to receive pre-
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scribed physical therapy for his compensable injury, the
claimant slipped and fell on ice and injured his left wrist
and shoulder. The Commission found that the claimant's new injuries were not compensable. The circuit
court affirmed, granting summary judgment in favor of
the employer. The court of special appeals reversed this
judgment.
The court of special appeals noted that when an
employee suffers additional injuries in the course of a
journey to a doctor's office occasioned by a compensable
injury, the additional injuries are generally held to be
compensable. The court stated that the rationale for this
rule is that, because the employer has a statutory duty to
provide medical care for the earlier compensable injury
and the employee has a statutory duty to submit to and
accept that care, the work-related injury effectively
causes the journey. The trip, in effect, arises in the
course of and out of the employment, rendering the
accidental injury compensable. Professor Larson calls
this approach "quasi-course of employment," which
subsumes those reasonable and necessary acts that are
not strictly within the course of employment but would
not have been undertaken but for the compensable
injury. An injured employee need not show that the first
injury contributed to the second accident.
Harris v. Mackin & Assocs., 100 Md. App. 363, 641
A.2d 938 (1994). Decided June 1, 1994.

D. Exception to the Going and Coming Rule/Intoxication
The court of special appeals addressed the issues of
the free transportation exception to the going and
coming rule and intoxication as a bar to benefits.
The claimant was injured in a one-car accident while
driving his own vehicle from an airport to his home on
return from a business trip. The claimant's job duties
required him to travel throughout the United States and
his employer reimbursed expenses of business travel,
including the cost of transportation to and from the
airport. A toxicology examination of the claimant
following the accident revealed a blood alcohol content
of 206 mg/dl, which expert evidence determined would
probably impair judgment, coordination, and response
time while driving. The claimant had testified at the
Commission that due to medical problems, he only slept
one to one and one-half hours per night during the
business trip and that sleep deprivation was a proximate

cause of the injuries.
Following a Commission hearing on contesting
issues of whether the claimant sustained an accidental
injury arising out of and in the course of employment
and whether intoxication was the sole cause of the
claimant's injury, the Commission ruled that the claimant did not sustain an accidental injury. The circuit court
reversed the Commission's decision and granted summary judgment for the claimant, finding as a matter of
law that the claimant sustained an accidental injury
arising out of and in the course of employment and that
intoxication was not a bar to benefits. The employer
filed an appeal to the court of special appeals.
The court of special appeals vacated the circuit
court's decision and remanded the case for trial by
ruling that whether the claimant's lost sleep was a
contributing cause to the injury was a material fact in
dispute and properly a jury issue, not a matter to be
disposed of by summary judgment.
Although the circuit court did not rule that the
claimant sustained a compensable injury under the free
transportation exception, the court of special appeals
held that this exception applied as a matter of law and
that appellate courts can affirm summary judgment
based on a ground not relied upon by the circuit court.
The court of special appeals held that the free transportation exception applies when an employer expressly or
impliedly provides transportation or reimburses expenses that bear a relationship to reasonable travel
expenses. Since the employer had obligated itself to
provide for the claimant's transportation during business trips, from the time he left home until the time he
returned, the free transportation exception applied as a
matter of law.
Accordingly, the court of special appeals remanded
the case for trial on the single issue of whether intoxication was the sole cause of the claimant's injury.

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lorkovic, 100Md.App.333,
641 A.2d. 924 (1994). Decided June 1, 1994.

the Uninsured Employees' Fund.
The claimant and his wife were owners of a closely
held corporation, the claimant serving as president and
his wife as vice-president. In February 1991, the
claimant fell while working at a construction site and
was seriously injured and hospitalized for almost two
months. At the time of the claimant's accident, the
corporation did not retain workers' compensation coverage. Thus, the claimant filed a claim for workers'
compensation seeking benefits from the Uninsured
Employers' Fund. The Workers' Compensation Commission ruled that the claimant was not a covered
employee under the Workers' Compensation Act and
was denied benefits. The claimant appealed this decision to the circuit court which affirmed the Commission' s decision. The claimantthen filed an appeal to the
court of special appeals.
The court noted that section 9-206(a) of the Act
states that an officer of a corporation is a covered
employee if the officer provides a service to the corporation for monetary compensation. However, according to this section, an officer of a close corporation has
the option of electing to be exempt from workers'
compensation coverage. In order to be exempt, the
section requires the claimant to submit to the Commission and to the insurer of the corporation a written
notice that he/she has elected to be excluded from
coverage. The Uninsured Employers' Fund argued that
this section did not apply because the claimant did not
possess workers' compensation coverage for his corporation. The court of special appeals disagreed and
noted that the clear meaning of section 9-206, which
grants the claimant the status of a covered employee
unless he expressly exempts himself, cannot be negated.
The claimant's failure to obtain insurance is "not interrelated with the determination ofeligibility for compensation from the Uninsured Employers' Fund."
Although the court determined that the claimant
was a covered employee and entitled to seek benefits
from the Uninsured Employers' Fund, it added that the
Uninsured Employers' Fund has a responsibility to
pursue the claimant's failure to secure insurance in the
manner it deems appropriate, including criminal penalties in the form of fines or imprisonment.

E. Uninsured Owner o/Corporation Entitled to
Workers' Compensation Benefits
The court of special appeals ruled that the owner,
president, and employee of a closely held corporation
that did not carry workers' compensation insurance is Lutter v. Lutter Constr., Inc., 103 Md.App. 292, 653
considered a covered employee under the Workers' A.2d 517 (1995).
Compensation Act and is entitled to seek redress from
----~--~---~-----
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II. BENEFITS PAYABLE UNDER THEACT
A. Death Benefits - Partial Dependency
The court of special appeals considered the issue of
whether a partially dependent minor should continue to
receive dependency benefits until age eighteen even if
benefits totaling $17,500 are received prior to the
attainment of age eighteen. The appellate court upheld
the trial court's decision and stated that section 9-682
of the Workers' Compensation Act requires that survivor benefits ofa partial dependent be capped at $17,500.
The deceased was killed in a work-related accident
and was survived by a partial dependent who began
receiving death benefits. Benefits in the amount of
$17,500 were paid prior to the partial dependent's
eighteenth birthday. When the cap of $17,500 was
reached, payments were terminated. The issue arose as
to whether the recodification ofthe death benefit statute
had eliminated the cap on partial dependency benefits.
The trial court as well as the appellate court determined that the statute clearly states that the $17,500
figure with respect to a partial dependent is an absolute
cap. Unlike the case of a wholly dependent spouse,
even ifthe partial dependency continues, no additional
benefits are due. Both courts found that the legislature
clearly intended to treat wholly and partially dependent
individuals differently. The appellate court noted that
while it is correct to state that the Workers' Compensation Act is to be construed liberally in favor of
claimants, this does not mean that the Act should be
construed to provide compensation beyond an authorized period. Although section 9-682 of the Act is a
recently revised section, it is clear that the legislature
intended that it be recodified without substantive change.
The court noted that an abrogation of the $17,500 cap
for partial dependents under the age of 18 would be a
substantive change in the law, which the legislature did
not intend.

Barr v. Barberry Bros., 99 Md. App. 33, 635 A.2d 64
(1994). Decided January 6, 1994.
B. Set-offAgainst Workers' Compensation Benefits
The court of appeals ruled that disability retirement
payments made pursuant to Article 101, section 33(b)
(now LE § 9-601, recodified without substantive change)
operated to set-off vocational rehabilitation benefits.
The claimant was employed as a correctional officer for

the Montgomery County Department of Corrections
and sustained a compensable injury to her back, which
prevented her from returning to that employment. After
receiving a period oftemporary total disability benefits,
the claimant began receiving vocational rehabilitation
benefits. At the same time, she also began receiving
service-connected disability retirement benefits from
the county, which amounted to two-thirds of her salary.
The county claimed a set-offpursuant to the applicable
statute and terminated the claimant's monetary benefit
under vocational rehabilitation. The claimant challenged this action, and the Commission ordered the
county to pay compensation during vocational rehabilitation. The county appealed. The circuit court granted
summary judgment for the county, reversing the Commission and holding that, as a matter oflaw, the statute
operated to set-off the claimant's disability retirement
payments against vocational rehabilitation weekly
benefits. The claimant appealed this decision and the
court of appeals, on its own motion, issued a writ of
certiorari prior to consideration by the intermediate
court.
The court first noted that for the statutory offset to
operate, the benefits received under the pension plan
and workers' compensation must be "similar." The
court stated that while ordinary retirement benefits may
not trigger the offset, it is well settled that disability
pension benefits are similar to workers' compensation
payments and will trigger the offset, even if disability
pension benefits result from a contributory plan. The
court concluded that benefits received under the disability retirement plan and vocational rehabilitation benefits
are similar within the meaning of the statute. The court
rejected the claimant's arguments that vocational rehabilitation benefits are intended to rehabilitate an injured
worker rather than to replace lost wages. The court
reasoned that although vocational rehabilitation
benefits are intended to rehabilitate an injured worker,
the cash payments during vocational rehabilitation are
a distinct provision intended to be a substitute for wages
while the beneficiary is recovering or retraining. Therefore, the cash payment component of the vocational
rehabilitation benefit is similar to the disability pension
benefit, and the county is, therefore, entitled to an offset.
The court also noted that under the claimant's theory,
the claimant would receive four-thirds of her prior
salary; the court did not believe the legislature intended
to allow such a windfall.
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Fikar v. Montgomery County, 333 Md. 430, 635 A.2d
977 (1994). Decided January 19, 1994.
C. Injuries to Scheduled Members and Other
Cases
The court of special appeals ruled that in cases
where the claimant injures two scheduled members, the
Commission may make an award for each scheduled
member or under "other cases," whichever results in
greater compensation for the claimant. The claimant
was shot in the head while on duty for the Baltimore City
Police Department, which resulted in the total loss of
vision in both eyes, total loss of sense of smell and taste,
and a head injury from the bullet that remained lodged
in the brain. At the Commission, it was stipulated that
the claimant was completely blind in both eyes, and the
Commission issued an order finding that the claimant
sustained an 85% industrial loss ofthe body as a whole.
The claimant appealed this order to the circuit court,
which reversed the Commission and found that the
claimant should be awarded 500 weeks for the total loss
ofvis ion under the schedule of specific injuries, plus an
additional 167 weeks for serious disability, and remanded the case to the Commission to further determine
entitlementto permanent partial disability under "other
cases" for the loss of sense of smell and taste, as well as
the head injury. The employer appealed this decision to
the court of special appeals, which affirmed the circuit
court's ruling.
The court noted that the legislature determined that
the compensation for the loss of use of an eye shall be
250 weeks. The court also noted that Larson and prior
Maryland decisions concluded that where a claimant
injures two scheduled members, an award may be issued
under the "other cases" provision in order to compensate the claimant beyond the schedule ofspecific disabilities. The court contrasted the loss of use of two eyes
to a situation where a claimant has both thumbs amputated. Under the scheduled member provision, a claimant would only receive 200 weeks of disability for the
total loss of both thumbs. Therefore, in that instance it
would be appropriate to award disability under "other
cases" as the loss of two thumbs may entitle a claimant
to more than twice the disability for the loss of one
thumb. In contrast, the court stated that since the
claimant should be awarded the higher measure of
compensation, where a claimant loses the total use of
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both eyes, the proper calculation would be to award
disability under he schedule ofbenefits, which would be
equivalent to 500 weeks of disability plus additional
weeks for serious disability, rather than a lesser amount
under the "other cases" provision.

Mayor ofBaltimore v. Cassidy, 99 Md. App. 465, 637
A.2d 897 (1994). Decided April 8, 1994.
D. Posthumous Claim for Permanent Disability
Under Other Cases
The court of special appeals ruled that a posthumous
claim forpermanentdisability under "other cases" may be
made after a claimant's death if sufficient evidence is
presented for an award of benefits to be made. The
claimant was injured on February 20, 1991 and received
temporary total disability benefits through the date of
his death from unrelated causes on November 9,1991.
Thereafter, his widow, as substitute claimant, pursued a claim for permanent disability benefits. At
the hearing, the claimant offered evidence from the
treating physician opining that the decedent had reached
maximum medical improvement as ofJune 10, 1991 and
was permanently totally disabled. The Commission
found that the claimant was not entitled to any permanent disability benefits because the decedent had not
reached maximum medical improvement prior to his
death. On appeal to the circuit court, cross motions for
summary judgment were filed. The claimant argued
that the decedent had, as a matter of law, reached
maximum medical improvement prior to his death. This
motion was denied, as the court found that there was a
dispute of material fact. The court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, holding that, as a
matter of law, there could not have been enough
evidence for a decision to be made as to industrial loss
of use. A motion to alter or amend judgment, arguing
that a determination of the decedent's industrial loss
could have been made based on medical records as to
the decedent's inability to return to work, was denied
and this appeal followed.
The court of special appeals reversed the circuit
court and held that there was a genuine dispute of facts
concerning the claim for permanent disability benefits.
The court initially held that posthumous disability ratings may be used as evidence in workers' compensation
cases. Moreover, the mere fact that the employer did
not have the opportunity to cross examine the decedent

__ ~____________ . ____________________ .25.3/:.;. Bait.
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as to the extent of his injuries does not bar a claim for
benefits. Finally, the court rejected the employer's
argument that no evidence of loss of earning capacity
was present, and therefore no finding of industrial loss
of use could be made since a finding of industrial loss
under "other cases" is equivalent to a finding ofloss of
earning capacity. The court noted that, based on the
treating physician's report, evidence was available, if
believed, that the decedent would have no post-injury
wages at all as he was permanently totally disabled.
Moreover, the court noted the difference between preand post-injury earnings may be considered in deciding
the amount of loss of industrial use but that it is not
mandatory and an inability to produce evidence ofpostinjury wages should not by itself defeat a claim for
benefits.

review the case on its own motion.
In reaching the decision that deputy sheriffs in
counties which have police departments do not qualify
as public safety employees for purposes of the Act, the
court reaffirmed its earlier decision in Soper v. Montgomery County, 294 Md. 331, 449 A.2d 1158 (1982).
In the Soper case, the court similarly treated deputy
sheriffs differently than police officers with respect to
the presumption of compensability of heart disease and
hypertension contained in section 9-503. In the Soper
decision, as in this decision, the court stated that the
establishment of a police department in a county results
in a dichotomy between the daily functioning of police
officers and deputy sheriffs. The court noted that in the
present case, the Howard County job descriptions clearly revealed this dichotomy. The court rejected the
claimant's argument that her responsibilities were simRalphv. Sears, Roebuck& Co., 102 Md. App. 387,649 ilar to those of a police officer, and that as a deputy
A.2d 1179. Decided December 1, 1994.
sheriff she retained the powers that sheriffs possessed at
common law which encompassed the same duties as
E. Public Safety Employee Under Workers' Com- those of police officers. Further, the court reviewed the
pensation Act
express language of LE section 9-628 and opined that
The court of appeals ruled that deputy sheriffs in since the section made no mention ofdeputy sheriffs, the
counties which have established police departments do legislative intent was clear.
not meet the definition ofpublic safety employees under
the Workers' Compensation Act and, therefore, do not Shah v. Howard County, CA No. 54, Sept. Term 1994.
qualify to receive the increased rate of compensation Decided February 6, 1995.
provided to public safety employees. Deputy sheriffs in
counties with no police departments will be provided III. APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
A. Right ofEmployer 's Corporate Representative
the higher rate of compensation.
The claimant sustained an inj ury to her right foot in to be Present at Trial - Harmless Error and Preservathe course of her employment as a Howard County tion of Issue for Appellate Review
deputy sheriff. The parties agreed that as a result ofthe
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the
inj ury, she sustained a 10% permanent partial disability, court of special appeals, which ruled that the trial court
but they were unable to agree on the rate of compensa- had committed reversible error when the court tempotion to be paid to the claimant. The claimant insisted rarily excluded the employer's designated representathat she should be compensated as a public safety tive from the courtroom.
After her claim was disallowed by the Commission,
employee pursuant to section 9-628 of the Act and
receive the higher rate of compensation which is pro- the claimant appealed to the circuit court where a jury
vided to certain firefighters, firefighting instructors, returned a verdict in her favor. The employer appealed
paramedics and, most importantly, police officers. The to the court of special appeals, arguing that it was
Workers' Compensation Commission determined that entitled to a new trial because the trial court had
the claimant did not qualify as a public safety employee. erroneously excluded the employer's designated repreThe claimant appealed the Commission's decision to sentative from the courtroom during a significant porthe circuit court where summary judgment was granted tion of the claimant's direct examination. The court of
in favor of the employer. The claimant then appealed special appeals found that error had been committed and
to the court of special appeals. However, before the the case was remanded for a new trial. The court of
case was considered, the court of appeals decided to appeals granted certiorari.

The court of appeals examined the issue of witness
exclusion and relied mainly on the case of Sa/eway
Stores v. Watson, 317 Md. 178,561 A.2d 1242 (1989).
Watson specifically states that a party that is not a
natural person has very broad latitude in the selection of
a representative when witnesses are excluded, and the
exercise of this right is not subject to the discretion of
the trialjudge. Watson also indicates that it is appropriate to presume prejudice from the wrongful exclusion of
a party, or its representative, from a trial. However, the
court of appeals noted that the issue of prejudice must
be properly preserved for review.
Here, the court found that the issue of prejudice had
not been preserved by the employer's counsel. The
court reasoned that the trial judge recognized her error
in excluding the designated representative and quickly
took steps to remedy the situation by allowing the
representative to return to the courtroom and take a seat
at the trial table. If the exclusion had been prejudicial
and infringed upon the employer's right to a fair trial,
then counsel for the employer had an 0 bligation, by way
of moving for a mistrial or for other corrective action,
to inform the trialjudge thatthe remedy was inadequate.
Otherwise, the employer is presumed to acquiesce in the
court's corrective action. The court of appeals went on
to state that even if the employer had properly preserved
the issue of prej udice for consideration, the error would
be deemed harmless as it would not have influenced the
outcome of the litigation.

Bobbitt v. Allied-Signal, 334 Md. 347, 639 A.2d 142
(1994). Decided April 8, 1994.

cision is presumed to be correct, and that the claimant
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Commission was wrong. Rather, the
trial court merely instructed the jury that the claimant
was presumed to be an independent contractor and that
she had the burden ofproving by a preponderance ofthe
evidence that she was an employee. The jury found that
the claimant was an employee, and the court of special
appeals reversed the trial court by ruling that the court
committed reversible error when it failed to inform the
jury as to the Commission's decision and its presumption of correctness.
The court of appeals, in a 6-1 decision, affirmed the
intermediate appellate court's decision based on the
same rationale. The court reviewed the applicable
statute and decided that the legislative intent was for
juries to be instructed as to the Commission's decision
and its presumed correctness. The court noted that an
instruction that provides a burden of proof but fails to
explain the basis of that presumption may result in
disregard ofthe instruction by the jury because it could
appear to be without reason. Therefore, since the
instruction given did not cover the substance of the
employer's requested instruction as to the Commission's decision, the court remanded for a new trial.
The sole dissenting judge opined that the failure to
tell the jury of the source of the presumption was not so
prejudicial that a new trial was warranted. In essence,
the dissent argued only harmless error had been committed.

Holman v. Kelly Catering, Inc., 334 Md. 480,639 A.2d
701, (1994). Decided April 15, 1994.

B. Instruction to Jury as to Presumption of CorC. Admissibility ofMedical Records In Workers'
rectness o/Commission Decision
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the Compensation Appeals
The court of special appeals considered the issue of
court of special appeals, which ruled that the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury as to the Commis- what medical records are admissible in a workers'
sion's decision was reversible error. The Commission compensation appeal at a de novo trial in the circuit
initially found that the claimant was an independent court. The Commission found that the claimant was
contractor and, therefore, not entitled to workers' permanently totally disabled, 50% ofthe disability due
compensation benefits. On appeal, the circuit court to the accidental inj ury, 40% due to pre-existing condirefused the employer's request for a jury instruction that tions and 10% due to subsequent unrelated disability.
the claim had previously been heard and decided by the The claimant appealed to the circuit court. At trial, the
Commission. The instruction, Maryland Civil Pattern claimant presented testimony of its expert witness via
Jury Instruction 30: 3, would have instructed the jury as video deposition. During the deposition, the claimant's
to the Commission's decision finding the claimant was expert commented upon an evaluation report prepared
an independent contractor, that the Commission's de- by an expert for the SubsequentInjury Fund, and during
25.3/ U. Salt. L.F. - :Y.3l
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cross-examination, counsel for the employer asked the admissible because they do not have the same guaranclaimant's expert to comment on a medical evaluation tees oftrustworthiness as treatment records. The court
prepared by the employer's own expert. Claimant's did not reach the question of whether such reports
counsel objected on the grounds of hearsay and moved would even qualify as business records. Based on the
that the testimony be stricken.
decision in this case, it is clear that evaluation reports of
At trial, the claimant introduced the video deposi- non-treating physicians should not be admitted over
tion into evidence. Over objection, the court permitted objection. This opinion is also instructive on the proper
the line of questioning of the claimant's expert regard- method to preserve objections to videotaped testimony
ing the reports of opposing parties' experts. At the and information omitted from interrogatory answers.
opening of the defense's case, the Subsequent Injury
The court also ruled that a trial court has broad
Fund moved to have its expert's report admitted into discretion in whether to permit a witness to testify as an
evidence. Over obj ection by the claimant, the trial court expert. The court noted that a witness "must demonruled that the two reports were admissible even though strate a minimal amount of competence or expertise on
the expert witnesses were not present in court and the subject on which he is allegedly an expert in order
subject to cross-examination. The jury found that the to be qualified to testify as an expert witness." Since the
claimant had an 85% permanent industrial disability, jury was instructed thatthe value ofan expert's testimo55% due to the work-related injury, 25% pre-existing ny should be weighed against the extent of the expert's
and 5% due to unrelated disability. The claimant noted training and experience, the court found no error on this
an appeal to the court of special appeals.
issue.
The court of special appeals ruled that the trial court
committed reversible error when it admitted into evi- Chadderton v. MA. Bongivonni, Inc., 101 Md. App.
dence the two written independent medical evaluations 472, 647 A.2d 137 (1994). Decided September 6,
because they were hearsay evidence. Prejudice was 1994.
shown to the claimant because each report was less
favorable than the claimant's expert witness's testimoD. Discoverability of Tax Returns
ny. The court ruled that, notwithstanding section 9-745
The court of special appeals ruled that federal and
ofthe Act, which provides that proceedings in an appeal state tax returns of a claimant are discoverable if
shall be informal and summary, the trial court must relevant, and are not privileged under either federal or
comply with the applicable rules of evidence.
state law. The claimant was denied vocational rehabilThis decision is important because it provides guide- itation and temporary total disability benefits and aplines for the admissibility of different types of medical pealed to the circuit court. During the pending appeal,
reports in trials of workers' compensation appeals. the employer requested that the claimant provide the
Hospital records are admissible as business records as amount reported as earned income on the past five
long as the information contained in them is patholog- income tax returns. The claimant refused to respond to
ically gem1ane to the claimant's treatment. This in- the interrogatory and the employer sought to compel
cludes medical opinions expressed in hospital records. production of the actual tax returns. The claimant
Less clear is the admissibility of reports of treating averred that since his income tax returns were filed
physicians as business records. The court specifically jointly with his spouse, production of such records
chose not to address that issue, but the ground work was would violate the rights and privileges of the claimant
certainly laid to allow the admission of treating physi- and his wife. The circuit court granted the employer's
cian's records insofar as they contain information patho- motion to compel production of the tax returns, and
when the claimant still refused to comply, the court
logically germane to the treatment.
Also found to be admissible are reports relied upon dismissed the appeal. The claimant appealed to the
by a testifying expert in rendering an opinion. In order court of special appeals.
The appellate court noted that both federal and state
for these reports to be admissible, however, it must be
established that reports of that type are reasonably law on confidentiality of income tax returns pertains
only to governmental employees and has no bearing on
relied upon by experts in that field.
Finally, reports of non-treating physicians are not whether a taxpayer can be forced to disclose his person-

al tax returns. As there was no Maryland case on point,
the court reviewed other states' decisions, and noted a
minority opinion allowing the taxpayer to claim a
privilege and a majority opinion concluding that state
and federal income tax returns were not privileged. This
majority position was split between states holding that
tax returns are not privileged and are fully discoverable
and states holding that tax returns are not privileged but
only relevant portions ofthe tax return are discoverable.
The court adopted the majority opinion that ruled that
neither federal nor state tax returns are privileged from
disclosure by the taxpayer, but that only relevant parts
of the tax return are discoverable. The claimant may
redact those parts relating solely to his wife's income.
The court further ruled that since tax returns could
contain information directly pertaining to the claimant's
ability to perform the type of work for which he was
previously qualified and to his overall ability to work,
that information was relevant to issues ofentitlement to
vocational rehabilitation and temporary total disability.
Accordingly, the court concluded that if the subject
interrogatory had actually called for the production of
tax returns, those documents would have been discoverable. Since the interrogatory did not request the
actual tax return, but merely the amount reported as
earned income, the court vacated the circuit court's
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings,
thereby giving the claimant an opportunity to respond
to the discovery request and provide the requested
information.

additional benefits on September 24, 1990, after the
five-year period had lapsed. The Commission found
that the claim was barred by limitations, but the trial
court reversed and found that the claim was not barred.
The court's rationale was either that the silence by the
insurer in response to the request for additional benefits
amounted to an estoppel by silence, or that the letter to
the insurer was the legal equivalent ofthe filing ofissues
with the Commission, or both. The insurer filed an
appeal to the court of special appeals, which reversed
the trial court's decision.
The court held that the trial court erred in finding
estoppel or waiver of the bar of limitations. The
rationale was that, as a matter oflaw, an insurer cannot
be estopped from raising limitations based on an allegation of silence in response to a request for benefits. The
court reviewed several cases regarding the issue of
limitations and estoppel, and found that the general rule
is that mere silence does not create estoppel. The court
distinguished a 1906 opinion relied on by the claimant,
and found that the claimant could have filed his claim
with the Commission regardless of counsel's letter to
the insurer. Moreover, the court concluded that an
insurer has no duty to advise a claimant of possiblt::
defenses. Therefore, silence cannot be a basis for
equitable estoppel. Finally, the court discussed several
cases in which a party was held to be estopped, and
indicated that egregious positive actions must be taken
by that party in order for it to be estopped from raising
limitations.

Ashton v. Churn Contracting Corp., 102 Md. App. 87,
648 A.2d 1067 (1994). Decided October 27,1994.

Mayor ofCumberland v. Beall, 97 Md. App. 597,631
A.2d 506 (1993). Decided October 5, 1993. Cert.
denied 333 Md. 200, 634 A.2d 61 (1993). Decided
IV. WORKERS'COMPENSATIONCOMMISSION December 17, 1993.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
A. Limitations Period for Reopening Claims

B. Limitations Periodfor Reopening Claims

- No.1
The court of special appeals ruled that an insurer is
not estopped from raising limitations even when it fails
to respond to a claimant's request for additional benefits
made prior to the running oflimitations. The claimant
was awarded workers' compensation benefits, and the
last payment of compensation occurred on September
19, 1985. On August 6, 1990, the claimant's attorney
by letter requested additional temporary total disability
benefits. The insurer did not respond to the request, and
the claimant filed issues with the Commission seeking

- No.2
The court of special appeals addressed the issue of
whether the Commission has the discretion to annul an
order and reinstate a claim for benefits that was dismissed voluntarily by the claimant and not refiled within
the applicable statute of limitations.
The claimant filed a timely claim with the Commission alleging an occupational disease that occurred on
January 1, 1988 as a result of exposure to lead. The
claimant's employer filed an Employer's First Report of
Injury on February 8, 1988, and the two-year statute of
25.31 U. Bait. LF. -

~lSi

-

limitations began to run. When the matter proceeded to
a hearing before the Commission, the claimant requested that his claim be dismissed. The Commission complied with this request and dismissed the claim on
December 8,1989.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1990, after the twoyear statute of limitations had run, the claimant filed
another claim for benefits alleging exposure to lead and
listing the date of disablement as January 17, 1990.
Hearings were held before the Commission, whereupon
the Commission dismissed the second claim as time
barred, finding that the actual date of the claimant's
disablement was January 1, 1988. The claimant thereafterrequested a rehearing whereupon the Commission
issued an order rescinding and annulling its initial
award. The Commission indicated that it was using its
discretionary powers to determine that the initial claim
was timely filed and that the second claim was merely a
motion to reinstate the first claim, thus avoiding the bar
oflimitations. The employer appealed and moved for
summary judgment in the circuit court on the ground
that the Commission's broad discretionary powers did
not permit a commissioner to disregard the statute of
limitations in order to revive a claim. The court granted
summary judgment for the employer, and the claimant
appealed to the court of special appeals.
The court ofspecial appeals affirmed the decision of
the circuit court. The court of special appeals recognized that the Commission has the power to modify any
of its prior findings or orders pursuant to section 9-736
ofthe Act. In this case, however, the Commission made
no "findings" in its initial withdrawal order. The
Commission simply granted the claimant's request to
withdraw his claim. The court stated that prior case law,
as well as the statute itself, makes it clear that a claimant
who voluntarily dismisses his claim without prejudice
must refile the claim within the two-year statute of
limitations. The court stated that nothing in the Act
empowers the Commission to reinstate a claim that was
voluntarily dismissed and has since expired under the
statute of limitations. Although the court recognized
the discretionary powers of the Commission, the court
emphasized that it has no power to create an unauthorized exception to the Workers' Compensation Act.

Southerly v. Perfect Auto Radiator Co., 101 Md. App.
113,643 A.2d 501 (1994). Decided June 30, 1994.
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C. Limitations Period for Reopening Claims
- No.3
The court of special appeals ruled that payment of
an attorney's fee imposed by the Commission against an
employer and insurer for failure to comply with a prior
order is not compensation under the Act. Therefore,
such payment does not extend the five-year period of
limitations to seek modification of a prior award after
the last compensation payment.
The claimant was injured in March 1981 and the last
payment of compensation benefits was in September
1985. In 1987 and 1988, the employer and insurer were
required to pay a fee to the claimant's attorney for
failure to comply with Commission orders, and payment of this penalty was made in 1989. The claimant's
petition to modify the nature and extent ofdisability was
filed on October 18, 1991, more than five years after the
payment of sanctions. The Commission held that the
claim was not barred by limitations and the employer
appealed. The circuit court reversed the Commission
and ruled that payment of counsel fees under the 1987
and 1988 orders were not payments of compensation
within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, the claim
was barred by limitations. The claimant appealed to the
court of special appeals which affirmed the circuit court.
The court first ruled that payment of counsel fees is
compensation within the meaning ofthe Act only when
the fees are approved by the Commission, and the fees
are payable from compensation awarded a claimant, at
which time the fee becomes a lien on the compensation
awarded. In the present case, the fee ordered due to the
employer's and insurer's failure to comply with Commission orders in 1987 and 1988 was not compensation
within the meaning ofthe Act as the fee was not payable
from compensation awarded to the claimant, and therefore, the fee did not become a lien on any compensation
awarded. Rather, the fee was a sanction or penalty.
Accordingly, the court ruled that payments of penalties
do not toll the running of the applicable statute of
limitations and the claim for worsening ofcondition was
barred.
The court also rejected the claimant's argumentthat
the employer and insurer should be estopped from
raising limitations due to its unscrupulous actions including three baseless appeals from Commission decisions. Moreover, the claimant alleged that she was
precluded from reopening her case from June 1988
through March 1991 due to pending appeals which

were eventually dismissed. The claimant asserted that
the Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear any new
disability claims during the pending appeal. The court
rej ected that argument, indicating that the Act does not
prevent the claimant from filing a request for a hearing
to avoid the statutory bar during a pending appeal.
Moreover, the employer and insurer did not induce the
claimant to refrain from filing issues with the Commission or engage in any fraudulent conduct or represent
that it would refrain from asserting the defense of
limitation. Finally, the employer and insurer were not
obligated to sua sponte begin temporary disability
payments following the claimant's surgery where no
request for benefits were made.

Stevens v. Rite Aid Corp., 102 Md. App. 636,651 A.2d
397 (1994). Decided December 30, 1994.
D. Enforcement of Settlement Agreements
The court ofappeals ruled that the Commission has
within its discretion the power to approve or disapprove fully executed settlement agreements submitted
to it. Following submission of a fully executed agreement, the employer and insurer attempted to unilaterally rescind the agreement since the claimant died of
unrelated causes eight days prior to a hearing set to
review the settlement. The Commission ruled that the
insurer could not withdraw from the agreement and
ordered that the agreement be approved. The circuit
court granted the claimant's motion for summary judgment. The court ofspecial appeals held that a settlement
agreement submitted to the Commission is a contract
subject to a condition subsequent. It is therefore binding on the parties pending only the Commission's
approval.
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the
court of special appeals, but provided a different rationale. The court of appeals ruled that the legislature
empowered the Commission with the exclusive jurisdiction and discretion to approve or disapprove settlements. Once a settlement agreement has been fully
executed and submitted to the Commission, a party may
not unilaterally withdraw from the agreement without
good cause being shown to the satisfaction of the
Commission at a hearing on the matter. Accordingly,
the court of appeals modified the decision of the court
of special appeals in that a party desiring to withdraw
from an agreement submitted to the Commission may

request that the Commission exercise its discretion to
modify, disapprove, or add certain provisions. Any
decision made is solely within the discretion of the
Commission. Ifthe settlement is approved, it is effective
and binding on all parties; if it is disapproved, it is not
effective and may not be enforced.
B. Frank Joy Co. v. Isaac, 333 Md. 628, 636 A.2d 1016

(1994). Decided February 10, 1994.
E. Jurisdiction over Medical Bills
The court of special appeals ruled that all claims for
payment ofmedical expenses must initially be presented
to the Workers' Compensation Commission for approval. A health care provider brought a declaratory
judgment action against the employer and insurer to
recover for medical treatment furnished to the claimant
allegedly due to a work-related injury. The Commission
had determined that the medical treatment rendered by
the health care provider was causally related to the
accidental injury. The employer appealed to the circuit
court, which reversed the Commission and determined
that the medical treatment in question was not causally
related to the compensable injury. After the circuit court
decision and the employer and insurer's refusal to pay
the outstanding medical expenses, the health care provider filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit
court seeking payment ofthe disputed medical expenses. The circuit court granted the employer and insurer's
motion to dismiss and the health care provider appealed
to the court of special appeals.
The court affirmed the circuit court's decision and
held that the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-409(b), restricted the right to
file for declaratory judgment by providing that if a
statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific
type of case, that statutory remedy shall be followed in
lieu of proceeding under this subtitle. The court further
held that the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act is
a special form ofremedy for a specific type ofcase as set
forth in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and,
therefore, must be followed in lieu of a proceeding under
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. Accordingly,
the court ruled that all claims for compensation for
medical treatment must be presented to the Commission
for approval. Finally, the court rej ected the health care
provider's contention that the Commission was divested of jurisdiction following the appeal, because the
25.3/0. Bait. :".:::, - ;?/J

Commission is divested of jurisdiction only during
pendency of an appeal and thereafter resumes jurisdiction over all issues.

Desi v. Northwestern Nat 'I Ins. Group, 99 Md. App.
640,638 A.2d 1242 (1994). Decided April 1, 1994.

the immunity from liability provided to the employer
under the Workers' Compensation Act.

Hastings v. Mechalske, 336 Md. 663, 650 A.2d 274
(1994). Decided December 9, 1994.

B. Unauthorized Settlement o/Third-Party Claim

IV. THIRD-PARTY CASES
A. Immunity 0/ Supervisory Co-employee from
Tort Suit
The court of appeals ruled that a supervisory coemployee is immune from liability to an inj ured employee under the Workers' Compensation Act if, at the time
of the accident, (1) he is performing a non-delegable
duty of the employer and (2) he performed that duty
during the course of his employment.
The claimant was injured while performing work for
a subcontractor on a construction contract to build a
loading dock. The supervisory co-employee, employed
by the general contractor, was responsible for the dayto-day activities ofthe project. The claimant's injury
occurred when he was knocked 25-30 feet off a scaffolding platform which was rammed by a backhoe. The
driver assigned by the supervisory co-employee to
operate the backhoe had little experience using this type
of equipment. The claimant filed suit against the
supervisory co-employee on the ground that he had
negligently entrusted the backhoe to an inexperienced
driver. The supervisory co-employee asserted that his
actions were undertaken inhis supervisory capacity and
that he enjoyed the same immunity from civil liability as
his employer.
The court of appeals affirmed the court of special
appeals' decision and noted thatthe Workers' Compensation Act provides an exclusive remedy for injured
employees against their employers. Thus, a supervisory
co-employee performing a non-delegable duty of the
employer within the course of his employment -- such
as providing a safe place to work -- cannot be held liable
in a civil action. Such an employee is entitled to the
benefit of the employer's immunity. The court of
appeals concluded that a supervisory co-employee may
be subject to liability only for negligently breaching a
duty ofcare which he personally owes to the employee.
However, a supervisory co-employee performing a
non-delegable duty in the course of his employment,
even if done so negligently, does not assume a personal
duty toward his fellow employees and is clothed with

The court of special appeals ruled that an unauthorized settlement between a claimant and third-party
defendant does not foreclose a claimant's future right to
compensation. Rather, if the employer and insurer can
prove prejudice by showing that the settlement was
unreasonably low, the employer and insurer can be
entitled to an additional offset up to a reasonable dollar
value of the third-party claim as determined by the
Commission.
The claimant was injured and pursued a workers'
compensation claim and third-party action. Despite a
workers' compensation lien, the claimant settled the
third-party claim for $6,500.00 without authorization
or knowledge by the workers' compensation carrier. At
a workers' compensation hearing, the Commission
determined that the claim for benefits was terminated by
the unauthorized settlement. On the advise of counsel,
no appeal was taken. The claimant's back condition
worsened, and the claimant became permanently totally
disabled. Based on the settlement of the third-party
claim and the Commission's final order, the claimant
was wholly without benefits and pursued a malpractice
claim against her former attorney. At trial in the
malpractice action, the claimant as plaintiff presented
expert testimony that the Commission's actions were
erroneous and that an appeal to the circuit court would
have been meritorious. Moreover, the expert testimony
opined that the case could have been decided on summary judgment without any need for expert witnesses.
The trial court struck the expert testimony, finding it to
be a misstatement ofthe law and granted the attorney's
motion for judgment. The court of special appeals
subsequently reversed.
The court noted that the precise threshold issue,
whether an employee's future right to compensation
can be foreclosed due to an unauthorized settlement of
a third-party claim, was a case of first impression. The
court ruled that the Commission erred since the Workers' Compensation Act set forth specific grounds for
termination on benefits, which did not include unauthorized settlements. Moreover, legislative history indicat-

ed an intent that a third-party claim should never result
in a decrease of benefits under the Act. Although the
employer and insurer could not avoid future benefits,
when they are materially prejudiced due to an unreasonable unauthorized settlement, the Commission should
determine a reasonable dollar value of the third-party
claim and allow the employer and insurer an offset up to
that amount. At the point where a claimant would have
received benefits equal to this reasonable amount,
future benefits would resume.
Based on the court's conclusion of this issue, it
reversed the circuit court's decision in the malpractice
suit and remanded with instructions that the claimant's
experts were correct and that the sole issue was whether
the attorney's advice that the claimant's appeal would
not succeed was reasonable and in accordance with the
standards of the legal profession.

Ankney v. Franch, 103 Md. App. 83,652 A.2d 1138
(1995). Decided February 1, 1995.

IV. INSURANCE COVERAGE
The U. S. District Court for the District ofMary land
ruled that a private insurance company providing workers' compensation insurance to a Maryland corporation
for non-Maryland based employees working in Pennsylvania is also liable for claims by the company's
Maryland based employees for injuries sustained while
working temporarily in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff,
L.R. Willson & Sons, had its principal place of business
in Maryland and performed work at construction sites
in Maryland, Delaware, D.C., Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Out-of-state work was performed by either
assigning Maryland based employees to temporary outof-state assignments and/or by hiring out-of-state employees to work temporarily at the out-of-state construction sites. The plaintiff purchased workers' compensation insurance for its Maryland based employees
from the Injured Workers' Insurance Fund. Additionally, the plaintiff purchased workers' compensation
insurance from PMA Group, the defendant, with the

intent of covering the non-Maryland based employees
who were hired temporarily and were injured outside of
Mary land. The plaintiffdid not intend that its Maryland
based employees who worked outside of Maryland be
covered by this policy. Nonetheless, the defendant
determined that the plaintiffowed additional premiums
because it concluded that it was exposed to liability
under Pennsylvania law for the plaintiff s Maryland
based employees who were temporarily assigned to
workplaces in Pennsylvania and who performed work
in Pennsylvania.
TheU.S.DistrictCourtgrantedsurnmaryjudgment
in favor of the defendant. The court noted that the
Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act applies to all
injuries occurring within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania irrespective ofthe place where the contract of
hiring was made, renewed, or extended. The court
rendered this decision notwithstanding the plaintiffs
argument that Pennsylvania should give full effect to
certain agreements which were signed by each of the
Maryland based employees. In signing the agreement,
the employee indicated that in the event ofinjury, he/she
agreed that all claims would be filed and rights would be
governed by the provisions of the Maryland Worker:s'
Compensation. The court rejected the plaintiff s argument and stated that "no private agreement can reduce
workers' compensation coverage for work and injuries
which occur in Pennsylvania, unless such agreement is
permitted by a Pennsylvania statutory provision." The
court noted that Pennsy lvania has no such statute with
respect to workers' compensation.
The effect ofthis decision is that Maryland employers who occasionally send their workers into Pennsylvania on business may have to cover those employees
with workers' compensation insurance for both states,
doubling the employer's cost, despite the fact that
employees may have agreed to have their claim filed in
Maryland.

L.R. Willson & Sons v. PMA Group, 867 F.Supp. 335
(D. Md. 1994). Filed November 15, 1994.
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